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A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR
A POLITICAL COURT
THOMAS W. MERuRL*
I offer a modest proposal. You can decide for yourself whether
it is offered in the spirit of Jonathan Swift,1 or whether I mean it
to be taken seriously.
The legitimacy of the Supreme Court is widely assumed to de-
pend on the perception that its decisions are dictated by law.
This is the central thesis of the extraordinary joint opinion in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,' decided by the Supreme Court at the
end of the 1991 Term. The joint opinion observes that the
Court's power lies in its legitimacy, and that its legitimacy is "a
product of the substance and perception" that it is a court of
law.3 Thus, frequent overrulings are to be avoided, because this
would "overtax the country's belief' that the Court's rulings are
grounded in law.4 Especially when a controversial ruling like Roe
v. Wad is involved, a decision to overrule should be avoided at
all costs, because this would give rise to the perception that the
Court is "surrender[ing] to political pressure" or "over-nul[ing]
under fire."6 Such a perception, in turn, would lead to "loss of
confidence in the judiciary."7 Translated, the thesis of the joint
opinion is that the further a decision deviates from the Constitu-
tion, the more important it is for the Court to adhere to that
decision, or else the public may conclude that the emperor is
wearing no clothes.
* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. See JONATHAN Sw=Fr, A Modest Proposal, in JONATHAN SWIMr: A CRMcAL EDITON OF
THE MAJOR WoR 492 (Angus Ross & David Woolley eds., 1984) (1729).
2. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
3. Id. at 2814. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter explain:
[O]verrulingRoe's central holding would... seriously weaken the Court's capac-
ity to exercise the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a
Nation dedicated to the rule of law.... The Court must take care to speak and
act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court
claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social
and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices
that the Court is obliged to make.
Id.
4. Id. at 2815. For a collection of similarjudicial sentiments, see Michael Herz, Choosing
Between Normative and Descriptive Versions of theJudicial Role, 75 MARQuErrE L. REv. 752,752-
53 & n.131 (1992).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. Casey; 112 S. Ct. at 2815.
7. Id.
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
The understanding that the Court's legitimacy is based on the
perception that its decisions are dictated by law is not unique to
the Justices. It is also implicit in a great deal of modern constitu-
tional scholarship. A central theme of this scholarship is the
search for a higher-order justification for the activist decisions of
the Warren and Burger Courts, one that would establish that
these decisions are in fact required by the Constitution. Thus,
whether the Court is being urged to adopt a representation-
reinforcing theory,' an integrity theory,9 a natural rights the-
ory,"° or a version of American civil religion," the underlying
objective is to supply a new foundation for the favored decisions
of the Court that will provide a more plausible basis for conclud-
ing that they are grounded in law, rightly understood. The com-
mon assumption of this scholarship is that the Court's decisions
will not be regarded as legitimate unless a coherent case can be
made that they are dictated by law.
Even the noisy exercises from the Left, which may be sub-
sumed under the banner of deconstructionism,' 2 rest ultimately
on the perception that the fates of the Court and mainstream
legal thought rise and fall on the claim that the Court's decisions
are governed by law. Like the Court and more mainstream theo-
rists, the deconstructionists believe that if the Court is unmasked
as a political body, its legitimacy will be destroyed. This is pre-
cisely what the deconstructionists wish to see happen, because it
is their faith that the unmasking will pave the way to a brave new
world in which newer and betterJustices enforce newer and bet-
ter political values.
The modest proposal I would like to make is this: The legiti-
macy of the Court would in fact be enhanced rather than dimin-
ished if the Court renounced the idea that its decisions are
8. See, e.g.,JonN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AN DISiTusr 77-88 (1980).
9. See, e.g., RONALD M. DwoRxn~, LAw's EMPRn 225-28 (1986).
10. See, e.g., DAVID A. J. MCtARs, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONITurIONALISM 92
(1989).
11. See, e.g., MICHAELJ. PERR', LOVE AND PowEP: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALnrr
IN AMIuCAN PoLrncs 43 (1991).
12. For an analysis of the various schools of the legal deconstructionism of the Left, see
DRUCrLuA L. CoRNmL, BEYOND AccOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECONSTRUCTION
Am THE LAW (1991) (discussing Critical Feminist Theory); MARu V. TusHNur, RED, WHrrE,
AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALTiS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1980) (discussing Critical Legal
Studies); MariJ. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscsimination Law, andJurisprudence
for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE LJ. 1329 (1991) (discussing Critical Race Theory).
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compelled by law, and instead openly acknowledged that it exer-
cises political discretion.13
If the Court openly acknowledged that it exercises political dis-
cretion, it would have to admit that its decisions are not qualita-
tively different from those of other political actors, such as the
President, Congress, and state legislatures. The problem, as
would be immediately obvious, is that the Court has no power
base from which to assert its political preferences. Unlike other
political institutions, the Court does not stand periodically for
election, and thus cannot claim any mandate from the people-
the ultimate source of authority in a democracy. Moreover, as the
joint opinion in Casey noted, "the Court cannot buy support for
its decisions by spending money and, except to a minor degree,
cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees."' 4
A Court that acknowledged its political dimension would also
be more vulnerable to retaliation from the political branches.
There are many potential avenues of political retaliation. The
most important is the power of Congress and the President to
enact (and enforce) new laws, and occasionally even constitu-
tional amendments, that overturn the Court's decisions. A more
remote but potent source of retribution is the power of the Presi-
dent to appoint newJustices who will vote to overrule the Court's
previous decisions. If push comes to shove, the President can re-
fuse to enforce the Court's judgments," and the Congress can
impeach Justices, force them to ride circuit, pack the Court, cut
off its funding, or eliminate parts of its appellate jurisdiction.' 6
An openly political Court would have little basis for resisting
these forms of political retaliation, and the threat they represent
would become more potent.
Given the weakness of the Court's position as a political institu-
tion, how would the Court behave if it acknowledged that its de-
cisions were ultimately the product of political discretion?
13. There is a large and gowing literature that seeks to explain the behavior of the
Court on the assumption that it operates as a purely political institution. See, e.g., William
N. Eskridge,Jr. &John Ferejohn, TheArtide I, Section 9 Game, 80 GEo. L.J. 523 (1992). The
suggestion explored here concerns what would happen if the assumption were adopted
by the Court itself as part of its normative conception of its role.
14. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814 (1992) (paraphrasing THE FED-
ERAusr No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
15. Compare Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Law and as Explanations for Judg-
ments, 15 CAIuozo L. REv. 43 (1993) with Michael S. Paulsen, The Menyman Power and the
Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARmozo L. Rv. 81 (1993).
16. See generally GEOFFRELP SToNE ET Al., CONSTrruTIONAL LAW 71-84 (2d ed.
1991) (describing these congressional powers in greater detail).
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Paradoxically, I think that the Court would pay more rather than
less attention to legal sources than it does now, would be more
rather than less restrained, and would get embroiled in fewer
embarrassing conflicts with the political branches. In other
words, if the Court openly acknowledged the political nature of
its decisions, it would behave more like a court and less like a
political institution.
The first paradoxical consequence would come about because
the Court always exercises its political discretion within a frame-
work of law-or at least what the legal community conventionally
regards as "law." Those who practice before the Court know that
legal materials-that is, statutory texts and to some degree the
text of the Constitution, evidence of original intent, and, most
importantly, the Court's precedents-impose significant limits
on what the Court hears, what results it reaches in those cases,
and what arguments it makes in support of those results. 17 Ulti-
mately the outcome of many, if not most cases, may turn on a
discretionary or political judgment. But the range of options is
significantly constrained by these settled understandings.18
If the Court is constrained by settled understandings up to a
point, but after that point exercises discretion, then in a world
where the Court openly acknowledged its political discretion, it
would have to make doubly sure that it complies with whatever
legal constraints do exist. It is one thing to exercise political dis-
cretion when available legal sources have been exhausted. How-
ever, given that the Court has no electoral legitimacy and no
power to enforce its own judgments, any perception that it is act-
ing contra legem would put it in an untenable position. Thus, a
Court that openly acknowledged that it exercises political discre-
tion would very likely pay more meticulous attention to conven-
tional legal sources, such as the text of the Constitution, than
17. For empirical support for the proposition that the Court is at least partially con-
strained by legal authorities, see Tracy E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme
Court Decision Making, 86 Am. POL. ScIENcE Rnv. 323 (1992).
18. The idea that judicial decisionmaking consists of both a realm of legal constraint
and a realm of discretion provides an important cornerstone in the legal philosophy of
H.LA. Hart. See H.LA. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141-44 (1961). This view has been
challenged by Ronald Dworkin and others, who observe that courts can, in addition to
exercising discretion when the rules are silent, also alter or circumvent these rules. See
RONALD M. DwOPurN, TAxRNG RMGHs SEIUousLY 31-39 (1977). I do not purport to offer a
contribution to this debate, but simply submit that practicing lawyers in reflecting on
their experience typically recognize that the Supreme Court is at once constrained and
yet exercises discretion.
[Vol. 17
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does the current Court, which seeks to foster the impression that
its opinions are fully determined by law.' 9
A second paradoxical consequence of acknowledging that the
Court is a political institution is that the Court would become a
more restrained institution, in the sense that it would be less
likely to try to use its power to promote controversial social re-
form. To see how this might happen, consider various decisional
rules the Court might adopt for the exercise of its political func-
tion after all legal constraints have been exhausted.
One possibility, vigorously promoted by Justice Scalia, ° is that
the Court would look to tradition for guidance in the exercise of
its political discretion. A standard of tradition might or might not
produce a more restrained Court, depending on how narrowly
the relevant tradition is identified." However, rigidly following
the narrow pathways of the past would make little sense in a
world in which the Court was understood to exercise political
discretion and thus was more dependent on public support to
avoid retaliation for its decisions. What garnered political sup-
port in the past might not be politically acceptable today or to-
morrow.22 For example, if the Court consistently followed a
19. Anyone who doubts that the Court frequently ignores the relevant text of the Con-
stitution and its own precedents should read David Currie's valuable two-volume study on
the history of the Court. See DAvID P. CUmE, THE CONSITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT.
THE FnisT HUNDRED YEARs, 1789-1888 (1985); DAVID P. CuRRi, Tim CONSTITUToN IN THE
SuPREmE COURT: Tim SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986 (1990). Time and again, Currie shows
that the Court has decided constitutional controversies without discussing or citing the
relevant constitutional text or its own prior decisions on point.
20. According to justice Scalia, the Due Process Clause "affords only those protections
'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal.'" Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). Therefore, for an asserted liberty interest to have due process
protection, the Court must find that the interest is rooted in the nation's traditions. See id.
at 123; see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2874 (1992) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (recognizing that the traditions of American society allowed abortion to be le-
gally proscribed prior to Roe).
21. For example, in Michad H., 491 U.S. 110, at 124-30, justice Scalia sought evidence
of a traditional understanding at a very narrow level, asking whether adulterous fathers of
children born to another married couple have ever been entitled to parental visitation
rights. Not surprisingly, he uncovered no such evidence.Justice Brennan, however, asked
whether there was any tradition protecting the parental rights of unwed fathers generally.
See id. at 139-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting). By framing the inquiry in this broader fashion,
he was able to conclude that there was a protected right at issue. See id. at 142-43. For a
similar contrast, compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986), where the majority asked whether homosexual sodomy was a funda-
mental right rooted in American history and tradition, while the dissent framed the in-
quiry more broadly in terms of a right to engage in private, consensual sexual activity.
22. Another, less familiar, illustration concerns the right of prison inmates to marry. See
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (finding a constitutionally-protected right of prison-
ers to marry despite the substantial restrictions imposed by incarceration). This right is
No. 1]
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norm of narrowly-defined tradition, many landmark decisions,
including Brown v. Board of Education,2" the reapportionment
cases, 24 and the gender discrimination cases, 25 would have come
out differently. These decisions are widely applauded, and there
is reason to believe that Court's standing with the public would
have suffered if it had decided those disputes according to the
dictates of narrowly-defined tradition.
Another decisional rule the Court might adopt is to conform
its exercise of discretion to existing majoritarian preferences, as
reflected, for example, in opinion polls. This, in fact, may be the
implicit decisional rule of Casey, which, after all its posturing
about not overruling under fire, proceeded to adopt a series of
outcomes that mirror almost exactly the preferences of a major-
ity of the American public as reflected in opinion polling about
abortion.2 6
From the perspective of a political Court, the purely
majoritarian approach is an improvement on the narrow-tradi-
tion approach. Moreover, there is reason to believe that much of
the Court's behavior can be explained on this basis .2 There are
several problems, however, with such a decisional rule. First, dis-
cerning majority opinion is often difficult because there are no
polls bearing directly on most issues that come before the Court.
The abortion controversy is somewhat exceptional in this regard.
Second, majority opinion may be unstable or in the process of
evolution, in which case embracing current opinion would leave
the Court "high and dry." Third, and perhaps most importantly,
the opinion of the majority reflected in polls may not translate
into political power, as when a majority is diffuse and poorly or-
not deeply rooted in narrowly-defined tradition. If, however, the Court declared no mar-
riage right in this context at all, it would almost surely expose itself to the claim that it
questions whether there is a constituitonal right to many, which would in turn undermine
the Court's standing as a political institution.
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
25. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973).
26. See EuzABrmz A. COOK Er. AL., Bmwaaw Two ABsoLuTEs: PUBLIC OPINION AND TH
PoLrrics OF ABORTION 140-46 (1992) (summarizing public opinion polling data and show-
ing that most Americans oppose an absolute ban on abortions but also favor parental
notification and consent, viability testing, and other restrictions on abortion).
27. See THOMAs R. MARSHALI, PUBLC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 78.80
(1989) (summarizing data showing that the Court follows public opinion most of the
time); David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision Making in
the Post-New Deal Period, 47 J. PoLmcs 652 (1985) (describing general consistency of
Supreme Court decisions on controversial issues with polling data).
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ganized, in contrast to certain minorities which are concentrated
and well organized.2" In these circumstances, the political system
may retaliate against the Court, even if the Court is faithfully re-
flecting majority views.2"
Perhaps the best decisional rule for a political Court to adopt
is to exercise its discretion in accordance with the emerging con-
sensus among the dominant political elites of society.30 If the
Court correctly anticipates the emerging consensus among those
with influence, then there is little danger that its decisions will be
overruled. Moreover, if powerful elites are happy with the Court,
then the Court can rest assured that the Executive will enthusias-
tically enforce its judgments, Congress will not cut its funding,
and no attempt will be made to circumscribe its jurisdiction. In-
deed, if the Court correctly anticipates the emerging elite con-
sensus, it will be hailed in the halls of Congress and elsewhere as
an enlightened and progressive tribunal of justice.
How does the Court discern emerging elite views? Various
techniques are available. One is to note the reaction of the polit-
ical branches to other decisions of the Court that are closely on
point.3 ' Another is to pay close attention to the briefs filed by
politically accountable parties such as the Solicitor General, Con-
28. See, e.g., MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGIsLAToRs: A THEORY OF POLITICAL
M.A~ xr (1981) (examining the circumstances in which special interest groups control
political outcomes by creating a "demand for public policy"); MANcuR OLSON, JR, THE
LOGIC OF COLLEcnIvE ACnON: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (arguing
that some large groups lack the incentive to organize into effective political lobbies to
advance the common interests of their members).
29. The 1991 Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codifted as amended in
scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.), which overruled six 1989 Supreme Court deci-
sions, provides a possible illustration of this phenomenon. The Court's rulings had the
effect of moving employment discrimination law away from numerical standards toward a
more color-blind approach. There is reason to believe that a majority of the American
public supported such an understanding. See Seymour M. Lipset & William Schneider,
The Bakke Case: How Would it be Decided at the Bar of Public Opinion?, 1978 PUB. OPINION 38;
Andrew Hacker, The Blacks and Clinton, N.Y. REV. OF BooKs, Jan. 28, 1993, at 14-15. Yet the
civil rights lobby intensely opposed any weakening of disparate impact theory or affirma-
tive action, and its political clout was sufficient, both with Congress and President Bush,
to secure an embarrassing repudiation of the Court. For a further discussion of the Act
and the six decisions it overruled, see George Rutherglen, Abolition in a Different Voice, 78
VA. L. Rxv. 1463 (1992) (book review).
30. The data on the Supreme Court and public opinion collected by David Barnum,
supra note 27, are more consistent with this decisional rule than with a purely
majoritarian rule.
31. For example, it is probably no accident that shortly after Congress first moved in
1990 to overrule the Court's civil rights decisions of 1989, the Court did an about-face on
government-mandated affirmative action in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Commu-
nications Commission, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of the FCC's
affirmative action program for the award of broadcast licenses).
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gress, and state governments. The positions taken by the Solicitor
General's Office, for example, are the product of an exhaustive
internal review, in which the Solicitor General considers the
views of various affected governmental agencies, and even private
parties, before deciding what legal position to take. The result,
generally, is a position that is "within the law," but also satisfac-
tory to a wide range of organized interests canvassed by the Solic-
itor General. 2
A third method of discerning emerging elite consensus is to
scrutinize the covers of amicus briefs filed by interest groups, to
see who has filed on which side and why. Often these briefs have
little to add by way of legal analysis, but they perform an impor-
tant signalling function by identifying for the Court which cases
have strong political overtones, which interests groups are suffi-
ciently concerned about the outcome to expend resources on fil-
ing a brief, and how the different interest groups line up on the
issue presented.
The final method for discerning emerging elite consensus is
for the Justices to read the editorial pages of the Washington Post,
the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal (or whatever news-
papers reflect elite opinion), to see what the opinionmakers have
to say about issues that come before the Court. Of course, the
views of the editorial writers do not always prevail in Congress.
Yet these journalists have the power to make an issue salient that
might otherwise be ignored, and their views often provide impor-
tant clues about the positions of powerful interest groups, which
have considerable influence in Congress.
To be sure, when all these sources are exhausted, considerable
difficulty will remain in predicting what the emerging consensus
of powerful political elites might be on any particular issue.
Herein lies the explanation for the second paradox: that a polit-
ical court will be a more restrained Court. A Court that admitted
to its exercise of political discretion, and then tried to exercise
that discretion by anticipating the emerging consensus among
32. It is interesting to note in this regard that many of the Court's 1989 civil rights
decisions overruled by Congress took positions more extreme than those urged in the
briefs filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Reagan Administration. This was true
in Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), overruled by The
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-433; Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); and
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1988). The fact that the Solicitor Gen-
eral was unwilling to press as far as the Court was inclined to go should have served as a
warning about the political limits confronting the Court on these issues.
[Vol. 17144
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political elites, would probably be much more cautious about en-
gaging in social engineering than a Court that is convinced that
it is the oracle of the law. When unable to predict with confi-
dence the emerging political consensus, an openly political
Court would invariably defer to the status quo, as embodied in
existing legislation. Only when the political Court could be rea-
sonably confident about the future direction of dominant op-
nion would it have the temerity to intervene to mandate a
change in the status quo.
A final paradox is that an openly political Court would very
likely be less prone to periodic crises than has been the case in
the past. To be sure, political scientists have persuasively argued
that the Court inevitably conforms its views about the Constitu-
tion to the demands of the dominant political coalition. For ex-
ample, Robert Dahl once calculated that the longest period
during which the Court was able successfully to maintain its con-
stitutional views in opposition to Congress was twenty-two years. 3
Thus if the Court expressly acknowledged that it exercises polit-
ical discretion, there is little reason to think that the ultimate
shape of our legal order would look fundamentally different
from the one produced on the assumption that the Court's deci-
sions are dictated by law.
However, a Court that expressly acknowledged its political role
would be less likely to forget the limitations on its power, and
thus less prone to engage in destabilizing conflict with the polit-
ical branches.34 Prominent examples of such conflicts include
Dred Scott v. Sandford,5 Lochner v. New York, 6 and Roe v. Wade."
Each of these cases can be seen as attempts by the Court to de-
clare the law so as to resolve societal conflicts in circumstances
where public opinion was, at best, divided. A Court more con-
scious of its own limitations as a political institution might have
avoided these debacles.
In sum, there are three main differences that would follow
from the Court's express acknowledgment that it exercises polit-
ical discretion. First, the Court would become more meticulous
33. Robert A. Dahl, Decisionmaking in a Democraty: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6J. PuBuc LAw 279, 290 (1957). The twenty-two year standoff concerned the con-
flict over whether Congress could enact child labor legislation.
34. See generally ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONsTrru nON IN CoNmar (1992).
35. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
36. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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about observing legal constraints on its behavior than it does cur-
rently. Second, the Court would be less aggressive about seeking
to engage in projects for the reform of society. Third, the Court
would likely avoid major embarrassments that come about when
it seeks to resolve highly divisive social issues by declaring one
side or the other the victor as a matter of law.
How probable is it that the Court will embrace the understand-
ing that its decisions contain elements of political discretion? Not
very. As long as the Court can peddle the idea that its decisions
are fully determined by law, as it did in Casey, the Court will have
every incentive to continue doing so, because its power as a polit-
ical institution is greater when it claims that its decisions are fully
determined by law. Moreover, it is unlikely that any single Justice
or group of Justices will ever have sufficient incentive to de-
nounce the public posture that the Court's judgments are dic-
tated by law. In effect, there is a kind of Gresham's law, or to use
the fancy modem terminology, a prisoner's dilemma, at work
here.3s Any Justice who openly acknowledged that the Court's
decisions are the product of political discretion would necessarily
become more law-bound and restrained than Justices who con-
tinue to insist that the Court's opinions are compelled by law.
The overtly political Justice would therefore consistently lose in-
fluence on the Court relative to Justices who maintain that their
decisions are dictated by law. Thus, no individual Justice or bloc
of Justices has an incentive unilaterally to embrace the idea that
judicial decisions are political.
If no hope can be expected from the Court on its own initia-
tive, then what should persons who believe in judicial restraint
and the rule of law do? One positive step would be to have the
Federalist Society, which contains many individuals of this de-
scription, cease promoting the ideas of people like my friend
Gary Lawson, 9 who believe that legal questions have right an-
swers. Instead, the Federalist Society should dedicate itself to pro-
moting deconstructionism, Critical Legal Studies, feminism,
Critical Race Theory, and the widest possible cacophony of lib-
eral constitutional theories. The message conveyed by these en-
terprises is that the Supreme Court is a political institution. The
38. A prisioner's dilemma arises when the pursuit of individually rational ends leaves
individuals worse off than they would be if they could act cooperatively. See generally
ANATOL RAPOPORT & ALBERT M. CHAmmAi, PRsioNER's DiLEMNA: A STUDY IN ConrUcr
AND COOPERATION (1965).
39. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Legal Theory: Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 859 (1992).
[Vol. 17
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more widespread this perception becomes, the closer will come
the day when the Court behaves like a court of law.
